Journée d’études autour du De Possest de Nicolas de Cues

Vendredi 28 Avril 2017, 9h15-17h00
Salle Paul Langevin, 29 Rue d’Ulm (ENS)


Modération : Dan Arbib

9h15 Accueil des participants

9h30-10h20 David Larre : « Le transfert des catégories à Dieu (translatio in divinis), §9 à 12 du De Possest. »

10h20-11h10 Marco Matteoli : « Spinning the top : a kinetic geometry, for a dynamic philosophy, §18 to 23 of De Possest. »

11h30-12h20 Mai-Lan Boureau : « ‘‘Mirabilis Deus, in quo non-esse est essendi necessitas’’ : le non-être, la créature et le créateur, §25 à 29 du De Possest. »


Modération : Jean-Pascal Anfray

14h-14h50 Frédéric Vengeon : « La rose unitrine. La connaissance conjecturale de la Trinité dans le De Possest. »

14h50-15h40 Marie-Anne Vannier : « Possest : un nom original pour Dieu ? »

16h-16h50 Pierre Caye : « Le De Possest ou de la Toute-puissance métaphysique. »

Contacts: ;

Atelier, La substance matérielle dans la scolastique tardive et la philosophie moderne

Programme — Program and schedule

Jeudi matin — 9.30-13.00

9h30-10h30 Dominik Perler, « Suárez on the Unity of Material Things »
10h30-11h30 Stephan Schmid, « Suárez on the Essence and Properties of Matter »
11h30-12h Coffee break
12h-13h Helen Hattab, « Creation and Subsistence: Late Scholastic Arguments on Thomist Prime Matter »

Jeudi après-midi — 15.00-17.30
15h00-16h00 Dan Arbib, « Les apories de la substance corporelle chez Descartes »
16h00-16h30 Coffee break
16h30-17h30 Tad Schmaltz, « Cartesian Mereology: Descartes and Spinoza »

Vendredi matin — 9.00-12.00
9h-10h Lucian Petrescu, « Defending the Indivisibles : Suárez against Cartesianism »
10h-11h Yitzhak Melamed, « The Indivisibility of Extended Substance in Spinoza »
11h-11h30 Coffee break
11h30-12h30 Martine Pécharman, « Digby on Quantity as Divisibility »

Vendredi après-midi — 14.00-17.30
14h-15h Mogens Laerke, « Figure, Form and Two Types of Extension in the Young Leibniz »
15h-16h Jean-Pascal Anfray, « Leibniz on the Vinculum: is Corporeal Substance really Composite? »
16h-16h30 Coffee break
16h30-17h30 Dan Garber, « Leibniz’s Dynamical Metaphysics: Materia Prima and Material Substance »

Contacts :


Conférence de Lawrence Nolan, The Ontological Status of Descartes’s Mind-Body Union

Conférence de Lawrence NOLAN California State University, Long Beach
The Ontological Status of Descartes’s Mind-Body Union

21 février 2017 16:30-18:30
29 rue d’Ulm, salle 235B

Some commentators have argued that Descartes is committed to the traditional Aristotelian conception of the human being as a hylomorphic unity or ens per se. This interpretation contradicts Descartes’s official mind-body dualism insofar as it implies that the human being is a third type of substance. It also raises problems about whether minds and bodies constitute genuine substances. As a result, it has been subjected to repeated criticism. While sympathetic with these criticisms, I think that there is something of great philosophical significance that partisans on both sides of this debate have overlooked : Descartes does have an account of the ontological status of the union of mind and body — one that goes beyond their causal interaction — but this account is highly reductive and perfectly consistent with his dualism. I argue that the mind-body union is not a genuine unity, but we ordinarily regard it as one whenever we are not engaged in philosophical meditation. This means the so-called mind-body “union” is merely a conceptual unity, for this way of regarding oneself is irredeemably confused and thus lacks ontological import. One virtue of this way of interpreting Descartes is that it explains some of his otherwise perplexing remarks to Elisabeth, including his much-discussed theory of notions primitives. It also reveals how he can ‘speak with’ the scholastics, and appear to endorse the hylomorphic conception of man, without contradicting his strict dualism

Répondant : Denis KAMBOUCHNER